Monetary integration in Mercosur processed in a context of strong macroeconomic volatility. This paper analyzes the feasibility of a monetary union within this zone. Instead of taking in account all the criteria of the optimal currencies areas, this study focuses on the macroeconomic cycles in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. First, we analyse cross-correlation to identify the degree of cycle synchronization. Second, a structural VAR model is built for each country. It allows us to determine the sources of shocks which hit these countries. Third, we decompose structural innovations -especially economic policies shocks-of domestic SVAR into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components using a statespace model. We assess in what extent economic policies are coordinated between the Mercosur countries.
INTRODUCTION
The Common market of the South (Mercosur) was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion signed between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. At the beginning the formal project was just a free trade agreement. During the 90s, the signatory countries envisaged a more ambitious economic and monetary process of integration. Then, an institutional framework promoting economic policies coordination was gradually set up. In 2000, the Treaty of Ouro Preto established a permanent structure dedicated to this coordination.
Targets and procedures intended to allow the convergence of public deficit and debt ratio were defined. A high-level macroeconomic Group of surveillance equivalent to the Ecofin council in the European Union was created.
This move in favor of more coordination can be partially explained by the successive shocks which hit the Mercosur countries during the 90s. Mexican (1994) , Asian (1997) , Russian (1998) , Brazilian (1999) and Argentina (2001 Argentina ( -2002 This evolution raises the question of the feasibility of a regional monetary union between the Mercosur countries. The purpose of this study is to bring some elements of answer.
Contrary to the basic optimal currencies areas (OCA) literature which proposes a costsbenefits analysis of a monetary union, our approach is exclusively based on the business cycles properties of the Mercosur countries.
A large body of empirical research focusing on symmetry and coordination issues in Mercosur has been published. Eichengreen (1998) , and Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) use cross country data and panel data to address the question whether the Mercosur countries need a single money. Their analysis is focused on the determinants of bilateral exchange rates volatility and on the OCA criteria. They stressed on the lack political will as one of the main obstacle to monetary union. However, the synchronization of cycles is analyzed in a rudimentary way: Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) use as indicator of asymmetric shocks the increment of the natural logarithm of the ratio of the GDPs of each pair of countries, neglecting the propagation of shocks between countries. Fanelli and González-Rozada (2003) apply a structural VAR model to identify the cycles and the coordination evidences within Mercosur. They deemed "symmetry" of shocks and try to shed some light on their sources.
The authors try also to identify the common and specific component of domestic cycles, a question in focus in our paper.
Using a dynamic panel setting, Ahmed (2003) analyzes the fluctuations in the main Latin American countries 2 . The author stresses mainly on two issues: it proposes to assess, on the one hand to what extent short term fluctuations of domestic variables are influenced by external shocks, on the other hand if a monetary union is relevant within Latin American countries and with the United States, from an OCA perspective.
To sum up these works, we may conclude to a weak correlation of cycles between Argentina and Brazil. Such a result suggests that the common disturbances are weak and / or that the responses to common shocks differ. As a consequence, the two main countries of Mercosur have no incentive to form a monetary union. Moreover, weak business synchronization with the United States is mentioned, suggesting difficulties of adjustments to innovation within a monetary union.
Studying Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay over the period 1991-2005, the following work shed a new light on integration and coordination issues amongst the Mercosur.
The remainder of this paper is organized in five Section. Section two presents and analyzes business cycles in Mercosur: Cross-correlations are used to bring to light evidences of propagation mechanisms and comovements. Section three presents the outcomes of the estimates of a structural VAR model for each economy; it identifies the interdependence between domestic macroeconomic variables, and with external ones, and the sources of disturbances. Section four proposes to breakdown structural innovations of domestic SVAR into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components using a state-space model. These results are used to check evidences of economic synchronicity, and convergence of macroeconomic policy. Section five concludes.
Our results confirm partially the recent literature. Cycles synchronicity within the Mercosur countries is weak. We show that these economies are hit mainly by nominal shocks rather than real shocks. Beyond, the fact that the shocks seem similar in their nature while the common components are weak suggests that there is a low degree of coordination of economic policies between these countries.
2 . Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Venezuela.
CYCLICAL COMOVEMENTS IN MERCOSUR: SOME EVIDENCES ON EMPIRICAL

REGULARITIES.
To investigate the issues of business cycle synchronization and propagation mechanisms of shocks we will begin the study identifying some stylized facts relative to the three main partners of the Mercosur, and the United States.
Reporting in Table 2 .1 the average quarterly industrial production index (IPI) growth rate of the three countries from 1991Q1 to 2005Q3, we can give a first conclusion about the dynamic of Mercosur countries for the period. Source: author's calculations using IMF data base.
As a whole, average growth rates are very low. Brazil exhibits the highest with the lower volatility; at the opposite, the Uruguayan IPI growth rate is both low and volatile. The wide gap between the observed maximum and minimum values of the growth rate reveals a high degree of instability. To conclude, real volatility is fairly high for the three countries (but it is the case of emerging countries in general, and of the Latin American one in particular!).
Choice of the Frequency and the Industrial Production Index
We use quarterly data from 1990Q1 to 2005Q3 for two reasons:
-on the one hand, annual data are generally available for long periods, even for emerging countries; but in this case their quality is low. Besides, during the 80s the three economies were very instable, mainly due to the debt crisis and the sequences of hyperinflation: such disturbances make the data processing very complex and instable.
-on the other hand, quarterly data are more appropriated to identify the business cycle dynamic and the links between short et medium terms. Unfortunately, quarterly data are available and comparable since only 1990 for the three countries.
We conclude choosing quarterly frequency for the period 1990-2005.
As index of production, we opted for IPI (and not GDP) for it is a monthly index while GDP is an annual one: although IPI is more volatile, we keep more information quarterizing a monthly IPI than picking a quarterized (yearly) GDP. Beyond, as IPI includes mainly output of tradable goods, it excludes an agricultural sector too sensible to seasonality and climatic shock, and a service sector characterized by the importance informal activities (Agenor, McDermott and Prasad, 2000) .
Stationarity and Cointegration Investigation
We begin checking -for each country -the stationarity of interest rates, and of the logarithm of all the other variables 3 . Standard Augmented Dickey Fuller tests are largely perturbed by numerous shocks, periods of high inflations, stabilization programs, and change in monetary, currency, or fiscal regimes. But even after correction of structural breaks (Perron, P.,1989) , all data are I(1), except interest rates I(0). Finally, tests of cointegration (Johansen) failed to find any cointegrating vector 4 .
To stationarize this series I(1), we use two detrending method:
1) first differentiation of the logarithm of variables;
2) decomposition trend/cycles by an HP filter. Investigating business cycles in developing countries, Agenor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) assess cycles length between two and four years. In another study, Rand and Tarp (2002) confirm that the usual length for industrialized countries -between 24 and 32 quarters-is not relevant for emerging market: the duration of business cycle is clearly shorter, between 7.7 to 12 quarters. So, we deduce a parameter "lambda" of 1600 for the United States and 400 for our emerging economies.
3 . Our model contains eight variables: world oil price, US industrial production index, Fed Funds interest rate, and for each Mercosur country: industrial production index, price production index, money market interest rate, monetary aggregate M2, and the real exchange rate. All the data are quarterly and stemming from International Financial Statistics of the IMF. For a detailed analysis of these variables, see our SVAR model below. 4 . All the tests are available upon request to the authors.
In the following section, we just present the conclusions inferred from times series detrended by HP filter 5 .
Cycles and Synchronization on the Mercosur Area
We measure the degree of business comovements of quarterly IPI growth by pairs of countries. We will mainly focus on the magnitude of cycles synchronization in the OCA perspective, looking at the cross-correlation of conjuncture between the three LA countries, and between them and the United States. For each L.A. country, we computed also the crosscorrelation between a set of key macroeconomic variables. We consider here only results about IPI cross-correlations 6 .
Following Agenor, McDermott and Prasad (2000), we measure the degree of comovement of the stationary component y t with another x t , derived from our series using the same filter H.P., by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient
. We will consider the series "y t " to be procyclic, acyclic, or contercyclic if the contemporaneous correlation ( ) 0 , Δ is positive, zero, or negative, respectively. In addition, we deem the series y t to be strongly correlated if
and uncorrelated in the other cases 7 . We say that y t leads the cycle by "j" periods if
is a maximum for a positive "j", is synchronous with the cycle if j=0, and lags the cycle if ( ) j Δ is a maximum for negative j.
We distinguish the cycles with the United States on the one side, and the cycles between the Mercosur countries on the other side.
Cross-correlations Between the United States and the Mercosur Countries 5 A similar analysis realized with log differenced data, but not presented here, converges to the same conclusion. 6 . Results concerning prices production index and real exchange rates are available with the authors. 7 . The approximate standard error of these correlation coefficients, computed under the null hypothesis at the true correlation coefficient is zero and given a number of observations per country in it sample, is about 13,5. Argentina and Uruguay of the other one (0.39 in both cases) and lesser influence of the American cycles towards Brazil ( 0.27 ). We thus have here a first illustration of the greater autonomy of this economy, as will be confirmed below.
However, the figure 1 seems to reveal two regimes: one before 1999, period for which the cycles are little synchronized, one after 1999 for which situations are more synchronized with the United States. The following explanation can fit with these facts: the first period is marked by a new phase of massive capital inflows which increased the autonomy of the conjuncture of these countries with respect to that of industrial countries. The decrease of capital inflows during the second period made more dependent the conjuncture of these countries of that of the USA.
In terms of the relevance a dollar area with the United States, we can thus conclude that the conditions are not gathered. The three Mercosur countries and the United States do not form an optimal currencies area.
Cross-correlations Between the Mercosur Countries
As reported in the appendix 1, the cross-correlations are sharply less significant than those obtained usely for the countries of the European Union and for the various states of the United States. However, the correlation between the cycles of our three countries is not nil.
Indeed, the contemporaneous correlations are significant except within Brazil and Uruguay.
The lagged correlations confirm a common cycle with a three years periodicity for Argentina and Brazil: so, the figure in appendix 1 exhibits a fairly significant negative cross-correlation for six quarters, and again a strong positive correlation for twelve / thirteen quarters. At least, the Argentina cycle precedes the Uruguayan one.
MODELING DOMESTIC CYCLES AND PROPAGATION MECHANISMS
Traditional literature about regional integration and OCA stresses on the identification of common innovations and on the magnitude of convergence in the adjustment process and in the policy packages. This section aims at deepening the previous study on comovement, shedding a special light on propagation mechanisms. As explained above, in the context of strong links of macroeconomic variables with complexes feed back linkages, VAR approach constitutes a useful tool: it allows to assess the consequences of structural (orthogonal) shocks on endogenous external and policy variables. The choice of a simple VAR in difference is deduced to the lack of cointegration vectors (any other solution would lead to greater forecast errors, as showed Allen, P.G., and Fildes, R., 2004) .
VARs are "a-theoretical": the usual way to introduce theory passes by the inclusion of restrictions in the structural VARs (SVARs), leading to specific predictions relative to the time path of endogenous variables as consequences of shocks.
Variables selections
Our choice of variables is the traditional one for VARs analyzing external shocks, and macroeconomic packages in open economies (Favero, C., 2001 , Lütkepohl, H., & Krätzig, M., 2004 Then, we deduce (orthogonal) structural innovations from residuals of the reduced form VAR, using identification restriction scheme (presented above). They are used to perform impulse response experiment and variance decomposition analysis of forecast errors. At least, a state-space model will carry out a decomposition of structural shocks to extract the eventual common component.
The model
The first step was estimating our VAR (in first difference of logarithm) for the three countries. The number of lags was selected using the common set of criteria and tests (available on the software Eviews). In presence of contradictory results, we followed the parsimony principle and chose the shorter lag (one lag for every country case). For each country "K", the standard (reduced) form of our VAR with constant is the following : 
In order to account for specific country shocks during the period, we added dummies: Curiously, tests for a dummy variable for the Argentinean currency board crisis didn't reveal a significant effect. So, we did not keep it in our model.
We have to keep in mind that our three economies have adopted different exchange rate regime. Beyond, they have evolved, following independent paths for the period:
-from 1991 to 2001, Argentina has adopted a currency board (hard peg), then an independent regime of floating;
-from 1991 to 1997, Brazil has adopted a crawling band regime (a kind of real exchange rate targeting) more or less "de jure" and more or less narrow, according to the context. After the strong currency crisis, in January 1999, Brazil implemented flexible exchange rate regime combined with inflation targeting.
-From 1991 to 2001, Uruguay adopted a crawling band, substituted in june 2002 by a flotation regime.
Results
Our purpose is twofold. On the one hand, we identify what kinds of shocks, real or nominal, produce higher fluctuations in the three countries. On the other hand, we deem the similarity of the reactions of macroeconomic variables to these shocks in our sample. We aim at obtaining a first outline of the behavior of these economies shocked by the structural innovations (notably in terms of speed of adjustment); moreover, we are waiting for information concerning economic policies responses to shocks.
We account for various kinds of shocks:
-two external real shocks: the world oil price as an international shock, and the U.S.
industrial production index as a regional shock;
-one domestic real shock with the industrial production index compiled for each Mercosur country;
-four domestic nominal shocks including production price index, money market interest rates, monetary aggregate M2 and the real exchange rate. As the real and nominal exchange rates produce similar effects on countries, we classify the first ones in the nominal shocks 8 .
In addition, over the studied period, the real exchange rate is strongly determined by the evolution of production prices. Nominal interest rates and real exchange rates are our policy variables. As in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) , M2 represents here the money demand (we don't consider it as a policy instrument). In spite of this assumption, responses of M2 to shocks remain difficult to interpret for the following reasons:
-in some case (for instance, Brazil), this aggregate includes liquid public debts. As a result, the behavior of M2 does not necessarily follow a transactional logic; -evolution of M2 are partly linked to the dollarization of countries. More exactly, it is advisable to take into account the facts that the degree of dollarization is not the same among studied countries, and that M2 eventually includes deposits in foreign currencies. Let us clarify this point.
Using the classification proposed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Argentina and Brazil belong to Type I dollarization -in which domestic and external liability dollarization co-exist-while Uruguay is a dollarized economy of Type II where dollarization is predominantly of a domestic nature. The degree of dollarization is different between these countries: high in Argentina (index 20 on a scale that goes from 0 to 30) and Uruguay (21), but moderate in Brazil (7). By exhibiting the share of foreign deposits in percent of total deposits, Table 3 .1 confirms these facts. 
External Real Shocks: Responses of Domestic IPI
The world oil price shock brings about two major influences on domestic economies. First, as a negative supply shock, it ought to carry a negative effect on the activity. But in the case of the studied countries, this expected effect will be balanced by the fact that Brazil and Argentina produce oil and other raw materials: as such they benefit from increasing oil and raw material prices (in many cases, the prices of these last ones used to follow oil prices fluctuations). Second, oil price increase is also an inflationary shock, leading to higher domestic production prices. In the following lines, we just consider the first effect.
The observation of IPI responses to WOP and US_IPI shocks shows a prevailing short term impact (about one-two quarters), with fluctuations of small magnitude. For instance, as result of a WOP innovation, we observe an increase of the growth rate of IPI for producers of gas and oil (Argentina and Brazil), and a limited drop in Uruguay. However, in every case, the equilibrium is restored within one year.
9 . The exchange rate regime of Uruguay collapsed in June 2002. The country adopted a floating regime.
Variance decomposition confirms these results. Innovations on WOP or the US_IPI never explain more than 10% of the variance of the IPI for our sample of three countries.
External Real Shocks: Responses of Domestic Nominal Variables
In three countries, a WOP shock leads to a price increase, either on the impact, or at the end of the first quarter. The adjustment of production prices is quite fast in the three countries.
The shock is absorbed after five -six quarters. The prices fluctuations are particularly marked and significant in Argentina. These facts can find two different interpretations.
On one side, it is an indication of higher flexibility in Argentina, with regard to the other countries. The fact that the adjustment in Argentina is a little faster consolidates this interpretation. On the other side, the strong fluctuations in prices can be the consequence of the currency board. This monetary regime reduces the smooth adjustments of the economy to shocks. As a consequence, either the adjustments are fast, but costly in term of short-run instability, or on the contrary they are very slow and painful.
The short-term prices increase following a shock on US_IPI is in accordance with the expected effects. The similarity of the effects with the shock on WOP does not mean that transmission mechanisms are identical. Higher oil prices increase the production costs, while the supply increase due to the shock on US_IPI entails a price increase of raw materials, and possibly wage costs, with an impact on the PPI.
We find again differences from the point of view of the size of the fluctuations. The
Argentinean prices react very strongly while the Uruguayan prices little. Also, the adaptation is longer in the first country with regard to the second. The two main economies of our sample have a significant price decrease after three quarters in Argentina and six in Brazil.
Variance decompositions confirm partially the previous results. The innovations on US_IPI explain a significant share of the prices variance in Argentina and Uruguay, but not in Brazil.
About the interest rates reaction to external shocks, two policy cases must be distinguished.
For countries having adopted an intermediate exchange rate regime on the greater part of period, i.e. Brazil and Uruguay, the world oil price shock is followed by a decline of the interest rate on three -four quarters. We can interpret this reaction as a traditional countercyclical answer to a negative shock. In both economies again, the interest rates increase few time after the US_IPI shock, and then decrease. This path rests on the pro-cyclical behavior of international capital flows: risk premium decreases while the American conjuncture improves, under the influence of better financial conditions in international financial markets. For Argentina -only country of our sample with hard peg -the reactions of the interest rate path seem much more struck. Indeed, the currency board reduces in a very strong way the ability of the economy to respond smoothly to shocks.
However, the interest rates reactions to previous shocks are little significant. The interpretation can be the following one: whatever the exchange rate regime, the rooms for maneuver of monetary policies were weak on the main part of the period. Indeed in the three countries, the interest rate was used to enforce the nominal anchor (where the exchange rate appears every time) in a context of disinflation policies. The counter-cyclical responses to shocks are thus limited. This analysis seems to be confirmed by the variance decompositions:
none of the external real variables exerts any influence on the interest rates, except Uruguay with the US_IPI. The innovations on this variable explain between 11 and 12% of the variance of U_PPI after eight quarters.
For the three countries, the responses of M2 to real external shocks are either not significant, or of very short term, with the exception of Uruguay. The responses of M2 in Brazil seem to follow those of the interest rate to the various shocks. More precisely, the fall in money demand on the impact of WOP shock is the consequence of the interest rate decrease. The higher money demand following the shock on US_IPI is explained by the interest rate increase consecutive to this external shock. Let us remind that in Brazil, the aggregate M2 includes liquid public debt. In Argentina, the adaptation of M2 to external shocks follows a transactional logic. It is linked to the adjustment of the prices.
We find the weak influence of the external variables in the analysis of the variance decompositions. The innovations on the American production explain between 10 and 16% of the variance of the Uruguayan monetary aggregate. Neither the innovations on WOP, nor those on the US_IPI, explain the variance of M2 in the two other countries.
In the three countries, the real exchange rates have a similar reaction to a WOP shock: strong contemporaneous depreciation and then appreciation. The responses are just significant in Argentina and Uruguay for one quarter; the effect is shorter for Brazil. Variance decompositions confirm this outcome: WOP innovations explain 14% of the real exchange rate variance in Argentina after two quarters, and 9.4% of the contemporaneous variance in Uruguay. No results are significant for Brazil.
The responses of the real exchange rates to shocks on the American industrial production lead us to a similar analysis. Indeed, the disinflation period implies that prices in the United
States as in the Latin American countries remained relatively stable during the 90s. As a result, the real exchange rates react weakly to US_IPI shocks. One more time, variance decompositions confirm theses observations.
External Nominal Shock: Response of Domestic Real and Nominal Variables
The US interest rates shocks are interpreted as monetary policy ones. After one quarter, the output falls slightly following the monetary contraction in the United States. The prices do not show significant responses. The interest rates increase in Brazil and in Uruguay (what seems in accordance with the traditional financial links), but decrease in Argentina.
However, this effect is a very short one (less than one quarter) and according to common knowledge about the currency board running, interest rate adjusts very quickly in Argentina.
The responses of the aggregate M2 are weakly or not significant with the exception of the Uruguay: we observe a decline of M2 on the impact of the shock explained by a monetary substitution process in favour of the dollars deposits not included in M2. In the three countries however, the adjustment is fast. And the real exchange rates exhibit an overshooting process, appreciating on the impact of the shock, to depreciate in a second time (as expected). The fluctuations exhibits short run duration.
Overall, responses of domestic variables are weakly significant and produce only short term effects. This does not imply that Latin American countries are not influenced by US interest rates. However, over the sample period, except 1994-1995 and the period after the second quarter of 2004, the main trend has been an US expansive monetary policy. As a result, the size of interest rates shocks looks relatively weak over the period.
Variance decompositions confirm the weak influence of US interest rate. The innovations of this variable explain the variance of the Argentinean interest rate (as expected for a currency board country) but without persistence effect (15% of the contemporaneous variance; 9.5% at quarter two), the variance of Uruguayan aggregate M2 (9.6% of the contemporaneous variance without persistence), and the variance of the Uruguayan real exchange rate with a strong persistence effect (17.1% of the contemporaneous variance; around 15% after).
Domestic Real Shocks
Shock on domestic IPI generates a very fast adjustment for Brazil and Uruguay (less than one year), and a slower one for Argentina (two years 
Domestic Nominal Shocks
We consider shock on PPI (Production Prices Index) as a demand one. Argentina shows a rapid adjustment with strong fluctuations of production index. In the other countries, the adjustment is smooth, and without major fluctuations. The responses of production are weak or not significant in the three countries. Interest rates increase in reaction of inflationary pressures. They follow the prices adjustments. In countries with "intermediate" exchange
rate regimes, interest rates responses are strong at short term, and the adjustment is slow.
This path is explained by a weaker credibility of monetary policy. Monetary authorities are constrained to react quickly in order to prevent the development of indexation mechanisms.
Real-balances effect explains the increase of M2 after shock on domestic prices. On real exchange rates, we have a significant appreciation over some relevant time horizon (four quarters in Argentina, six in Brazil, and eight in Uruguay), but the effects are really significant only in three countries, for approximately two quarters.
The analysis of variance decompositions allows us to stress the influence of prices in these economies. Innovations on prices do not explain the variance of production, but they exert a significant influence on other nominal variables. In the three countries, the effect on interest rates is important and persistent (over 30% in Argentina after two quarters; between 27 and 38% pour Brazil; from 33 to 49% in Uruguay). The reaction of authorities to any pressure on prices rests on the inflationary history in these countries. We find also a significant influence on the monetary aggregates M2 (particularly for Brazil). The impact is less important in both dollarized countries (Uruguay and especially Argentina). Innovations on prices explain around 25% of the variance of the real exchange rate in Brazil and Uruguay, suggesting a limited adjustment of the nominal exchange rate linked to the fear of floating. The extreme rigidity of nominal exchange rate under a currency board explains the fact that prices exert a strong influence on the real exchange rate in Argentina (more than 55% of its variance).
The innovations on interest rates are monetary policy shocks. In the three countries, IPI decreases after the shock, but the effect is particularly significant in Argentina. The production in countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes reacts less to the interest rate shock. Prices responses exhibit a traditional puzzle: prices increase on the impact of the shock, then decrease. Prices movements can also be interpreted as a Cavallo-Patman effect where higher interest rates increase production costs via the financing needs of working capital, leading to inflationary pressures (Taylor, 1981) . A liquidity puzzle is observed for the responses of M2 in Brazil and Uruguay: money demand increases after the interest rate shock. As stressed above, money demands are unstable in these countries. In Argentina, the responses of M2 are consistent with the expected effects in traditional money demand functions: the opportunity cost to hold money increases with the interest rate. As a result, money demand falls. The responses of the real exchange rates in Argentina and Uruguay are consistent with prices. In Brazil, we observe an immediate depreciation followed by an appreciation.
In some ways, the adjustments after an interest rates shock seem fairly fast in the three countries: the main part of adjustment for the set of endogenous variable lasts four quarters Shock on real exchange rate is a depreciation followed by a slight and short re-appreciation, in the three countries. The effects on other variables have as short duration, between two and three quarters. The responses of Uruguayan variables are particularly weak. These responses could be explained by the fact that the standard-deviation of the real exchange rate in
Uruguay is the weakest of the three countries. On the contrary, the standard-deviation is the highest in Argentina: but it is probably due to the exchange rate crisis of January 2002.
Variance decompositions confirm this weak influence of the real exchange rate over the sample period... But we must remember that during the main part of the period, monetary authorities had smoothed its volatility, either because its adoption as "official" nominal anchor, or to avoid "pass through" effects (even after the adoption of inflation targeting and flotation regime).
Preliminary conclusions
The previous results show that the studied countries react to nominal shocks rather than to real shocks. On the one hand, innovations on nominal variables produce the most significant fluctuations. On the other hand, they exhibit the strongest persistence effect.
In the three countries -and more particularly in Argentina, the only country of our sample with a hard peg regime during the main part of the period -we observe a weak monetary activism. However, our results show that even if countries were hit by rather similar shocks, their adjustments and their reactions were different. In other words, VARs suggest some similarities in the nature of the shocks, but they show clearly that the domestic dynamics were different after the shocks. From this point of view, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay do not constitute an optimal currencies area. Our last study will confirm this outcome.
IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF STRUCTURAL SHOCKS USING STATE SPACE MODEL
The main purpose of the VAR estimation is to obtain non-recursive orthogonalization Moreover, it becomes impossible in case of common monetary zone. In short, any integration process implies symmetry, i.e. a large common component.
The model
In order to assess the share of the common and idiosyncratic components in the variability of the structural shocks, we propose a breakdown in two unobservable stochastic components using Kalman filter (Harvey, A.C., 1989 , Kim., C.J., Nelson, C.R., 1999 , , to compare more easily structural shocks relative to a specific variable across our three systems (one by country).
In order to respect an adding up constraint (for each country, the weighted sum of the variance of idiosyncratic component and common component must be equal to the unity), we will restrict them imposing the variance to be equal to unity. So,the transition system will be:
, , Specification tests are derived using a maximum likelihood approach (Harvey, A.C., 1989) .
Foreign shocks
In all our results, C(1), C(2), and C(3) point out the weight of common component in the structural shocks for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay respectively.
Shocks on foreign variables give us an assessment of the method pertinence. These variables, are presents in the three VAR models (and thus endogenous).I the Choleski matrix allowing the identification of structural shocks, they are ordered as following (from the less to the more endogenous): Oil Price (WOP), US Industrial Production Index (US_IPI), US interest on the Fed. Funds (US_R). We can assume that the series of structural innovations for this foreign variables -deduced from the three equations of the three country models -embody a significant common component for the three countries: the origin of these shocks is exogenous and common for the domestic bloc of the three country models!
In spite of the poor performance of oil price estimates, we can check that the oil price shock common in the three systems… is effectively recognized as common by our program! It is a way to check that the UCM (Unobservable Component Model) identifies common components. In less degree, it is also the case for the two other external variables (US_IPI and US_R). In table A.4.1., A.4.2., and A.4.3., the common component represents between 70 and 80% of the variance for oil shock, a little less for both the other shocks.
We can note also that the score for Brazil is always lower (a confirmation of the larger autonomy of Brazilian economy regarding to US conjuncture?)
Domestic shocks
The first shock is represented by domestic series of structural innovations in the IPI in the three VARs. (Table A .4.4) . The Argentinean cycle is taken as bases (i.e. as reference for the other countries). The Brazilian real cycle is not significantly linked to any common trend, on the contrary of the Uruguayan one. But even in this last case, the weight of the common component in lower that 10%.
We try to estimate a common component by pairs of countries in Mercosur: the experiment is consistent with the previous outcomes: Uruguay shares probably the same proportion of common component than in the three country model (even if the test here is less significant), and the Brazilian shock doesn't share any common component neither with Argentina, nor with Uruguay.
We got identical results than in the case of PPI shocks, with evidences of a common component between Argentina and Uruguay (Table A. 4.5.) . In the case of other shocks -domestic interest rates, money aggregate, real exchange rates -we did not find any hints of common trend (Tables A.4.6, A.4.7, A.4.8) . As the three last shocks account more or less for the economic policy, it is once more a proof of the lack of coordination between the three main partners of Mercosur. In short, these outcomes confirm the conclusions of Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) outlining the lack of policy coordination within the Mercosur. The lack of common component for M2 confirms also the conclusion of our VAR: the money demand in the three countries follows idiosyncratic patterns!
CONCLUSION
Our results converge to indicate that the Mercosur countries are not predisposed to form a monetary union either between them, or with the United States. First, cross-correlations show that the weak synchronization of cycles suggests the presence of asymmetric shocks and/or different economic policy responses to shocks. Second, the VARs confirm the weak coordination of the economic policies between these countries identified in other studies.
While these countries seem all to be hit essentially by nominal shocks, the adjustments are different. Third, our state-space model shows the weak common component of shocks representing economic policies. It suggests again the weak coordination within the area.
However, we must interpret with caution these results. On the one hand, the period of study is relatively short. On the other hand, the strong sensibility of these countries to international capital flows was not explicitly taken into account here. So, a future research has to concern a more precise modelling of the financial instability of these countries and its consequences as for the costs-benefits of a monetary union 11 . It is thus advisable to integrate into our analysis EMBI spreads and implications of the dollarization, notably from the point of view of the presence of balance-sheet effects following the currency depreciations.
11 . Edwards (2006) uses probit panel regressions to investigate if countries forming a monetary union have a lower occurrence of sudden stop episodes and of current accounts reversal episodes, and if they are more able to absorb external shocks. His answers are negative: belonging to a currency union has not lower the probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal, and external shocks have been amplified in currency union countries. 
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Domestic Variables Shocks:
In all our results, C(1), C(2), and C(3) point out the weight of common component in the structural shocks for Argentina, Brazil, and Urugay respectively. The reference country is defined as the country whose the cycle has a dominant weight during the attribution of the values of initialization. When Argentina is present, it is chosen as country of reference to the cycle of which are compared the other cycles. Otherwise, the reference country is
Brazil. This choice is arbitrary, but it does not modify the results. In particular, it does not hide the presence of a common component when there is such component.
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